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Abstract
Humans use theory of mind when predicting the thoughts and feelings and actions of others. There is accumulating
evidence that cooperation with a computerized game correlates with a unique pattern of brain activation. To investigate
the neural correlates of cooperation in real-time we conducted an fMRI hyperscanning study. We hypothesized that real-
time cooperation to complete a maze task, using a blind-driving paradigm, would activate substrates implicated in theory of
mind. We also hypothesized that cooperation would activate neural reward centers more than when participants completed
the maze themselves. Of interest and in support of our hypothesis we found left caudate and putamen activation when
participants worked together to complete the maze. This suggests that cooperation during task completion is inherently
rewarding. This finding represents one of the first discoveries of a proximate neural mechanism for group based interactions
in real-time, which indirectly supports the social brain hypothesis.
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Introduction
Cooperation is integral to facilitating survival [1]. Kin selection
theory [2] describes why individuals and animals cooperate and
behave altruistically toward genetically related individuals. Howev-
er, the theory of kin selection does not fully explain why humans
(and certain other species) have evolved to cooperate with
individuals other than kin and often do so in ways where reciprocity
is not direct or instantaneous. Both direct reciprocity, the
opportunity to cooperate with another person when it is likely you
will meet again, and indirect reciprocity, where the likelihood that
you will meet again is very low, require complex computational
systems of analysis to determine whether it is beneficial to partake in
such cooperation [3].
The brain guides humans in realizing that accepting altruism
without reciprocating is only beneficial in the short-term. Humans,
because of theory of mind, also have the capacity to weigh long-
term rewards, consequences, and circumstances resulting in
decisions that allow for the survival of mutual cooperation [4–5]
in the absence of genetic relatedness. Human theory of mind
(ToM) allows for the representation of one’s physical and mental
states including motoric, mental, emotional, perceptual, and
visceral [6] – self-awareness. This highly developed sense of self-
awareness has allowed humans the unique capacities to think
about themselves and to also consider the states of mind [7–9] and
to make inferences about the mental states of others [10–11]. It is
the cornerstone of the human ability to deceive, empathize,
cooperate, and to interpret complex body language and a
cornerstone of sociality [12–13].
Along with this unique ability to understand others and their
motives, there is also a unique pattern of brain activation that
accompanies cooperation with human partners. Rilling et al. [4]
found that the caudate, rostral ACC, and OFC are linked to social
cooperation; however activation in the ACC and caudate may be
specifically linked to cooperation and human interaction as they
were not evident with computer mediated cooperation.
The link between cooperation and theory of mind are essential
in the current study because we hypothesized that ToM and the
reward centers of the brain would be active when participants
were tasked with working together, cooperating, to solve a motoric
task – driving through a maze. Furthermore, it was hypothesized
that in instances where participants reached the end of the maze
while instructing their partner, activation in the reward network
would be greater than the activation in the reward network when
completing the maze alone in the self-drive condition [4].
Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the University of Liverpool, School
of Biological Sciences Committee on Research Ethics. All par-
ticipants provided written informed consent to participate in the
study.
Participants and Task
Twenty eight participants (14 pairs; Mage=24.5; SD=4.04; 18
females; 10 males) were recruited. Participants were asked to work
together to complete a series of mazes while engaged in
simultaneous fMRI scanning (hyperscanning). In this interactive
task both subjects cooperated while undergoing simultaneous real-
time fMRI to reach the end of a series of mazes. A form of ‘‘blind
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another and work together to reach the end of the maze. One
participant served as the ‘instructor’ and the other as the ‘driver’.
The instructor can view the maze field; however he cannot
interact with the maze. In order to navigate the maze he must send
directions, using the keypad, to his partner, the ‘driver’. The driver
then receives the instructions, which appear in the form of
numbers that are coordinated with directional instructions (left,
right, forward, and backward) on an MRI-safe response pad. The
driver presses the appropriate button on his response pad to move
through the maze, but he is blind to the maze environment. This
would be tantamount to getting into the driver seat of an
automobile while wearing a blindfold and following instructions on
what actions to take from the passenger (e.g., press accelerator,
press brake, turn left, right, stop, etc). See (Figure S1).
Sixty seconds were allotted for the completion of each maze.
Participants were informed that they would be working against the
clock to find the end of the maze. Mazes were presented
sequentially in pairs of 2 with a 20 second rest/scrambled image
screen presented at the beginning, end, and in between mazes. All
participants undertook the role of instructor for four mazes
(instruct condition), completed 4 mazes on their own (self-drive
condition), and finally undertook the role of driver (drive
condition) for 4 mazes. Participants were randomly assigned a
starting role as instructor or driver and participants completed the
self-drive condition while the other participant received their
structural scan to reduce overall time in the MRI environment.
The order of mazes was randomized across participants.
Imaging parameters
Participants were scanned using one of two scanners: Siemens
Symphony 1.5 Tesla and a Trio 3 Tesla scanner. While the use of
scanners that differ in field strength is not optimal, sequences for
the two MRI scanners were optimized to make the imaging
parameters as analogous as possible. In the Symphony scanner,
functional images were collected using an EPI sequence
(TR=3000 ms, TE=45 ms, FOV 1926192 mm, slice thick-
ness=3.5 mm, gap=.5, number of slices=35). Participants also
underwent a 7-minute structural scan (MPRAGE: 176 slices,
TR=2040 ms, TE=3.93 ms). The remaining participants were
scanned using a Trio 3T scanner (TR=3000 ms, TE=30 ms,
FOV=1926192 mm, slice thickness=3.0 mm, gap=3.3 or 10%,
number of slices=42). The parameters of the MPRAGE structural
scan are the same as above except that the TE=5.5 ms.
fMRI Imaging Analysis
For pre-processing and statistical analysis of the fMRI data the
researchers used the FMRIB Software Library. Single subject pre-
processing was done for each participant, correcting for motion
using MCFLIRT [14] and brain extraction using the BET tool
[15]. Images were also intensity normalized and smoothed (full
width half max=6). All higher-level analyses were performed
using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) version 5.98 [15] and
mixed effects modeling. After the pre-processing, first level
contrasts for each condition were created: drive, self-drive,
instruct. They were then entered into higher-level mixed effects
analyses to get the combined results from both scanners and
participants: collapse drive (drive condition 1.5T+drive condition
3T), collapse instruct (instruct condition 1.5T+instruct condition
3T), collapse self-drive (self-drive condition 1.5T+self-drive
condition 3T), collapse instruct versus collapse drive (collapse
instruct2collapse drive), collapse self-drive versus collapse instruct
(collapse self-drive2collapse instruct), collapse self-drive versus
collapse drive (collapse self2collapse drive). Finally contrasts were
combined for the pair (drive+instruct conditions) versus self-drive
contrast ([collapse drive+collapse instruct]2[collapse self-drive])
and the self-drive versus pair contrast ([collapse self-drive]2[col-
lapse drive+collapse instruct]) to show the activation when one
participant is instructing and the other is driving and they are
working together to solve the maze. All higher level contrasts were
set to a z=2.3, p,0.05, unless otherwise stated. These contrasts
allowed us to examine patterns in activation when participants
were working together versus working alone in the maze task.
In the second part of the analysis, the same pre-processing and
statistical analyses were performed in the same way as discussed
previously. After pre-processing we created first level contrasts at
the individual level for all of the instruct and self-drive conditions.
The drive conditions, except for self-drive, were not included in
the contrasts because participants were not given feedback about
whether or not the maze was completed; therefore, they did not
know if they had successfully completed the maze or not. In the
second level analysis, conditions were contrasted at the individual
level. For example if a participant completed the maze during the
self-drive condition in the first part of the round, but did not
complete it in the second part of the round (each maze set has 4
mazes- 2 pairs of 2 mazes), and then completed both rounds of the
mazes during the instruct condition then his contrast would be
something like this: self-drive complete – self-drive not complete;
self-drive complete – instruct complete; self-drive not complete –
self-drive complete; self-drive not complete – instruct complete;
instruct complete – self-drive not complete; instruct complete –
self-drive complete. In other words, each participant’s condition
was contrasted at the individual level with the other possible
outcomes.
Third-level analysis brought everything to the group level.
Contrast Parameter Estimate (COPE) files were combined for all
participants that fell into each category. Using the previous
example, that participant’s COPE files would have been combined
with other participants’ for each contrast, so all participants COPE
files were combined under the proper category to create group
activation means. FMRI data processing was carried out using
FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) version 5.98, part of FSL
(FMRIB’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Z
(Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded at p=.05
(uncorrected). Images were thresholded (z.1.6) using non
corrected significance threshold of p,.05 unless otherwise stated.
Results
First level Instruct contrasts were collapsed across both
scanners. Activation was evident in the following areas: bilateral
frontal pole, bilateral medial frontal gyrus, right precentral and
postcentral gyrus, right subparietal lobe and right inferior
temporal gyrus. Furthermore, there was activation in areas that
have been implicated in the ToM network: the precuneus, left
anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC), the left superior temporal gyrus,
and bilateral medial temporal gyrus (Table S1 for coordinates)
Next self-drive contrasts were collapsed across both scanners. The
following areas showed significant levels of activation during this
task: bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, bilateral precentral and
postcentral gyrus, bilateral posterior middle temporal gyrus, right
paracingulate gyrus, and left precuneus cortex (See Table S2 for
coordinates). No voxels survived cluster correction in the collapsed
drive condition. The collapsed instruct versus collapsed self-drive
contrast reveals activation that survived after all activation from
the instruct condition was combined and then the collapsed
activation from the self-conditions was subtracted (collapse instruct
– collapse self). This contrast illustrates which areas were more
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self-drive condition). The areas where activation was seen are as
follows: occipital pole, left precuneus, left inferior temporal gyrus,
and right lateral occipital cortex. No activation survived the
collapsed self-drive versus the collapsed instruct contrast. The
collapse self-drive versus collapse drive contrast revealed activation
in the left inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus cortex and posterior
cingulate gyrus, right paracingulate gyrus, and left middle
temporal gyrus. The contrast, pair versus self-drive, combined
the driving and instruct conditions and contrasted them against
the self-driving condition ([collapse drive+collapse instruct] – self-
drive). Significant activation was evident in the precuneus cortex,
orbital frontal cortex, postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus
(anterior and posterior division), left caudate and putamen, as well
as the lateral occipital cortex. Finally in the self-drive versus pair
contrast, the self-drive condition was contrasted with the paired
driving and instruct conditions (self-drive2[drive+instruct]). Acti-
vation was found in the inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, posterior
cingulate gyrus, paracingulate, and middle frontal gyrus (See
Table 1.)
In this second portion of the analysis brain activation between
those who completed the maze and those who did not complete
the maze was compared. Ultimately, comparisons were made
between these four conditions: Instruct Complete (IC), Self
Complete (SC), Instruct Did Not Complete (IDN), and Self Did
Not Complete (SDN) (See Table 2).
Comparisons were made between all possible permutations of
these four conditions (See Table S3). The contrast, IC –IDN,
compared those who completed the maze during the instruct
condition versus those who did not complete the maze when they
wereinstructing. Activation was evident in the followingareas of the
brain: left caudate, bilateral temporal lobes, left posterior cingulate
gyrus, and left putamen. In the contrast, IC-SC, activation was
contrasted between participants who finished the maze during the
instruct condition and participants who completed the maze during
the self-drive condition. Activation appeared in the following
substrates: left precentral gyrus, right precuneus, cerebellum, left
superior frontal gyrus, right lingual gyrus, right postcentral gyrus,
left post central gyrus, left precentral gyrus. Activation was evident
in the following substrates for the SC - SDN contrast: Bilateral
paracingulate gyrus, right anterior cingulate gyrus, left posterior
cingulate gyrus, bilateral precuneus cortex, bilateral middle frontal
gyrus, left precentral gyrus, bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral
frontal pole, left supramarginal gyrus. Finally in the SC-IC contrast,
activation was evident in the left anterior cingulate gyrus, bilateral
frontal pole, caudate, paracingulate gyrus, bilateral superior
temporal gyrus (posterior division), bilateral middle temporal gyrus,
and the precuneus cortex.
Table 1. Pair versus Self-Drive Contrast.
Pair Activation Hemisphere X Y Z z-score
Precuneus Cortex L 28 256 62 4.28
Superior Frontal Gyrus L 222 4 212 4.88
Postcentral Gyrus L 228 240 44 3.91
Supramarginal Gyrus (anterior and posterior) L 228 240 44 3.91
Superior Parietal Lobule L 212 260 62 3.68
Putamen L 222 2 26 4.23
Caudate L 216 18 0 3.88
Lateral Occipital Cortex R 34 288 6 3.48
Occipital Pole R 36 288 10 3.36
Self Activation
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 246 16 18 4.86
Precuneus L 22 258 42 4.68
Superior Frontal Gyrus L/R 0 20 52 4.02
Paracingulate Gyrus R 6 24 54 3.84
Middle Frontal Gyrus L 244 10 34 4.68
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus R 12 252 34 4.04
Activation coordinates and z-scores from Pair versus Self-Drive (top) and Self-drive versus Pair (bottom).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030613.t001
Table 2. Conditions and descriptions for comparison between completed and incomplete maze attempts.
Condition Description
Instruct Complete (IC) The maze was completed during the instruct condition.
Self Complete (SC) The maze was not completed during the self-drive condition.
Instruct Did Not Complete (IDN) The maze was not completed during the instruct condition.
Self Did Not Complete (SDN) The maze was not completed during the self-drive condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030613.t002
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Participants showed activation in putative ToM substrates (e.g.
precuneus cortex, OFC, supramarginal gyrus, paracingulate gyrus)
and reward centers (e.g. caudate and putamen) when cooperating
with others. The activation patterns for the collapsed instruct
condition (occipital pole, left precuneus, left inferior temporal
gyrus, and right lateral occipital gyrus) suggest that participants
were recruiting parts of the ToM network to process information
as they gave instructions. In fact, substrates associated with the
ToM network were evident in all of the contrasts: instruct, self-
drive, pair versus self-drive, and self-drive versus pair. Because the
task required participants to think about their own behavior in all
conditions, as well as to consider the actions of others in response
to their instruction, the ToM network activation makes sense.
Even in the conditions when the person was working alone, many
of the same areas that are recruited for thinking about others may
be recruited [7–8], which is consistent with Gallup’s hypothesis
[7].
Precuneus activation was present in all conditions. Activation in
the precuneus has been associated with mentalizing about
cooperation, the self and others [16–17]. In stories describing
deception, cooperation, or combined cooperation and deception
the precuneus seems to be particularly involved in processing
information pertaining to cooperation [18]. In part, the findings
correspond to this suggestion, as the instructor was working to
cooperate with the driver on the maze task, activation was evident
in the precuneus. Furthermore, left precuneus is one of the regions
activated when attributing emotions to other people and the self
[18–19]. Additionally, the precuneus has also been connected to
visuo-spatial imagery. The precuneus is linked to motor imagery
and abstract mental imagery tasks [20]. Because of the nature of
the maze task, some of the precuneus activation is likely related to
the visuo -spatial imagery components of the maze task.
Furthermore, activation in the superior and medial frontal gyri
was evident in all of the conditions. Activation has been reported
in the superior frontal gyrus and the medial frontal gyrus in
response to cooperation stories [18]. Activation in these areas has
been related to both cooperation and deception, but there were
some differences in the degree of activation given the type of story
(e.g. cooperative or deceptive) [18]. Portions of the superior frontal
gyrus and the medial frontal gyrus are also considered part of the
medial prefrontal cortex (with connections to the OFC) and are
consistently reported in ToM tasks [21–24,18]. Research has
shown that the medial prefrontal cortex and the ACC are
implicated in making the distinction between self and other
[18,25,9]. During the instruct condition one could interpret these
findings as suggesting that participants were thinking about what
they were doing and what needed to be communicated to their
partner-participant to facilitate movement through the maze.
Overlap in Neural Activation on Self-Drive and Instruct
Conditions
The self-drive condition revealed activation in many of the same
substrates that were active in the instruct condition (See Figure 1).
An overlap in the brain areas associated with working alone to
complete a task and cooperating with another person emerged in
this condition; that is, participants likely simulated one’s self in that
situation and used that to model the mental state of another [7–9].
Many of the same areas recruited for self-reflection are also
recruited for ToM [18]. Johnson et al. [26] found anterior medial
prefrontal activation and posterior cingulate activation in their
examination of self-reflection. A similar situation arose in this
study. Participants in the self-drive condition showed activation
that overlapped with the pair drive and instruct activation,
suggesting that the active substrates may not be specifically self-
reflective ToM functions, but that they are involved in
metacognitve functioning, generally.
Executive Function and Reward
The collapsed self-drive condition revealed activation in areas
associated with executive function and reward. The lateral orbital
frontal cortex (OFC) showed bilateral activation. In an attempt to
tease apart the functions of the OFC, it was hypothesized that the
lateral OFC is heavily involved in the decision making process in
situations that are ‘‘incompletely specified’’ and in suppressing
previously rewarded responses ([27], p. 310). Circumstances
requiring individuals to make judgments with an incomplete set
of information creates an element of unpredictability, and this
appears to activate areas of the lateral OFC [27]. Furthermore,
research supports that the OFC monitors reward values, and in a
novel (or uncertain) situation an appraisal can be made resulting in
appropriate response evaluation and selection [27]. Additionally it
Figure 1. Collapse Self-Drive and Collapse Instruct. Overlay of Collapse Self-Drive (yellow) and Collapse Instruct (blue). Figures are in
neurological orientation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030613.g001
Reward Activation during a Cooperative Maze Task
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30613was reported that lateral OFC and caudate activation was evident
in instances of short-term reward prediction [28]. In accordance
with others, Tanaka et al. [29] reported that as immediate rewards
were dispensed for learned actions, activity was evident in the
lateral oribitofrontal cortex and the striatum.
These findings provide support for the role that the OFC may
have played in the present study. Participants were unsure of the
outcome of the task and the OFC may have been integral in
assessing the task and making decisions about how to proceed.
Additionally, the OFC may have also been activated upon the
immediate anticipation and receipt of the reward, which was the
completion of the maze. In particular the OFC may have been
linked to the reward system in the pair versus self-drive contrast, as
the caudate nucleus and putamen, areas that have been implicated
in reward [30] were also active. It is our interpretation that where
other components of the reward network are activated the OFC
activation is possibly linked to reward activation.
Reward Center Activation
In the pair versus self-drive contrast activation was evident in
three areas associated with reward: OFC, caudate, and putamen
(Figure 2). The caudate and nucleus accumbens are known for
their reward response [30], and they receive dopamine projections
from the midbrain [4,30]. It appears that the OFC is essential in
the control of goal directed behavior [31–33]. Lesions of the OFC
lead to impaired decision-making regarding the outcome of actions
[34]. Because rewards are imperative to the primary goals of
behavior, human motivation may be linked to the processing of
reward stimuli in the OFC [35]. In other words, positive
reinforcement is one of the primary functions of rewards, and
the OFC is integral in this process.
Reward Centers and Maze Completion
Substrates of the reward system in the brain were activated,
specifically the OFC/MPFC, caudate and putamen when the IC
activation was contrasted with IDN and the SC was contrasted
with IC conditions. Additionally reward network activation
survived several of the other contrasts, and this activation appears
to be linked to completing the maze by oneself or during the
cooperation condition, but the main component is that the reward
areas are active during successful maze completion.
A higher level contrast was run between (IC – IDN) – (SC –
SDN) and (SC – SDN) – (IC –IDN) to investigate the unique brain
activation between instruct complete and self complete conditions,
controlling for activation in the instruct did not complete (IDN)
and the self did not complete (SDN) conditions. Results indicated
that the caudate and putamen were significantly more active
(p,.05) in the (IC – IDN) – (SC – SDN) contrast. This suggests
that in the incidents where the participants were working together
and successfully completed the maze activation in the putamen and
caudate, reward centers of the brain, was significantly stronger
than in the conditions where participants completed the maze
alone. According to Damasio the caudate and putamen serve the
following functions: ‘‘The putamen is involved mainly in
evaluating actions in terms of sensory contexts and rewards,
whereas the caudate nucleus is involved mainly in comparing
actual and predicted rewards for learning’’ ([36] p. 948). Putamen
and caudate activation are also related to anticipation of reward
[28]. Furthermore, this finding appears to provide support for our
previous conclusion that the caudate, and perhaps the putamen as
well, may be uniquely related to the reward that accompanies
engaging in successful cooperation to achieve a goal with another
individual or the anticipation of such a reward.
Conclusion
One goal of this study was to examine how cooperation (two
individuals working together on a task simultaneously) differed
from doing a task alone. The control task, or self-drive condition
was designed to provide a basis of comparison for activation when
one is working alone. While there was a great deal of overlap in
the self-drive condition and the instruct condition, there was a
distinct difference in the pair (or combined brain vs. the self-drive).
Reward centers in the brain were active in the pair contrast. Thus,
it appears that variation in the reward system is activated
depending upon whether one completes the maze alone or in
cooperation with another person. This activation difference might
suggest that the participants experienced some anticipation about
the successful completion of the maze via communication with
their partner. While it is rewarding to navigate the maze by
oneself, as evidenced by activation in the OFC, it may be more
rewarding to navigate the maze under conditions of real time
cooperation. Activation in the OFC was evident in this contrast
and most importantly caudate and putamen activation was
present. The activation in the caudate and putamen is unique to
this contrast, and these parts of the brain seem to play a special
role in cooperation and reward [37]. Parts of the reward system
network were dissociated, and it was found that anticipation of
reward resulted in activation in the caudate and the putamen,
whereas notification that the reward was earned revealed
activation in the medial prefrontal cortex [28]. Others report that
the caudate is associated with cooperation when one is making
decisions about social reward for their partners during a game
[30]. Activation in the caudate and anterior cingulate gyrus was
found following cooperation in a Prisoner’s dilemma game [10].
Specifically, this response is isolated to the condition where
participants were cooperating with another human being. Perhaps
Figure 2. Activation in the caudate in the Pair versus Self-Drive Condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030613.g002
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interaction and the rewards associated with it. As Rilling suggests
[10] the incorporation of the reward system in cooperative
interactions has helped to lay the groundwork and maintain
human cooperation among individuals who are not kin.
This study has shown that the theory of mind network is
associated with cooperation in this task as well as when receiving
and considering instructional requests/needs of a cooperator.
Additionally, many of the same neural correlates associated with
cooperation are also incorporated in self-reflection, as evidenced
by the activation patterns in the self-drive condition. Most
importantly, activation in the caudate nucleus and putamen was
apparent only when the participant was cooperating and working
with the other participant, in the combined brain contrast. In the
second part of the study results indicated that in fact, caudate and
putamen were the unique remaining activations in the critical
contrast between the instruct complete condition and the self
complete conditions: (IC – IDN) – (SC – SDN). Components of
the reward system were activated when completing the maze with
their partner. This unique activation may suggest that there is a
particular part of the reward system, possibly residing in the
caudate or putamen, that is involved in the reward associated with
human (i.e. conspecific) social interaction. However, caudate and
putamen activation was still evident in some of the self-complete
contrasts as well as the other IC conditions. So the reward center
activation is not completely limited to working with another
person.
There are several important limitations in this study that should
be addressed. First, we did not do our analysis on an individual by
individual basis. The contrasts were collapsed across all subjects so
one should exercise caution in making generalizations and
assuming that this activation pattern was evident for all subjects.
There are definitely individual differences to take into account, but
they are not examined in this analysis. We can say that on an
‘‘average’’ it appears that these areas of the brain were more active
and involved with the completion of the maze with another
person. Future investigations that carefully measure individual
variation on traits such as, but not limited to personality, social
ability, or mindfulness would add greatly to our understanding of
this socialization based reward process. Secondly, we did not
collect precise temporal information for this task. We did not
account for the time it took to complete the maze in our analysis
because all of the mazes were randomly assigned. Therefore, the
issue of task difficulty comes into question. If the task was more
difficult, as one assumes that it might be when the participant was
trying to instruct another person, then it is fair to say that it is
possible that some of the reward center activation could be related
to task difficulty rather than cooperation. We did however, vary
maze difficulty with some of the mazes being very easy and other
being more challenging which were randomly assigned to
participants and should have mitigated some of the possible effects
of task difficulty.
Overall, this study demonstrated that working together to
complete the maze resulted in the greatest activation in the
caudate and putamen reward areas, compared to other conditions.
This finding provides a proximate neural underpinning for
Dunbar’s social brain hypothesis [13].
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